

Transnational Islamic Infiltration in Indonesia

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Abstract

Transnational Islam is a movement that is not limited by national borders, it has an influence on the thoughts, ideology and policies of a country. This article will discuss topics related to Transnational Islamic Infiltration in Indonesia by examining the historical development, ideology, and characteristics of transnational Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb ut Tahrir and Salafi Wahabi. Based on a survey conducted by Alvara Research and Wahid Institute, it was found that some Indonesians show intolerant and radical attitudes influenced by transnational Islamic movements. This research uses a qualitative method and discourse analysis approach. This research tries to examine data from various literature related to Transnational Islam and its infiltration. In addition, this research also examines various surveys that measure the level of radicalism and intolerance in Indonesia. The results of this study show that Transnational Islam has a political agenda in the form of formalising Islamic sharia and establishing an Islamic caliphate that transcends national boundaries and contradicts the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). This research recommends that in studying and understanding Islam, it is necessary to use a contextual approach in order to maintain harmonious values and Islam.

Keywords: Transnational Islam, Radicalism, Caliphate, Formalisation of Islamic Law

Abstrak

Islam Transnasional adalah sebuah gerakan yang tidak terbatas oleh sekat batas negara, ia memiliki pengaruh terhadap pemikiran, ideologi dan kebijakan sebuah negara. Artikel ini akan membahas topik yang berkaitan dengan Infiltrasi Islam Transnasional di Indonesia dengan mengkaji perkembangan historis, ideologis, serta karakteristik gerakan-gerakan Islam transnasional seperti Ikhwanul Muslimin, Hizbut Tahrir dan Salafi Wahabi. Berdasarkan survey yang dilakukan oleh Alvara Reseach dan Wahid Institut ditemukan bahwa sebaian masyarakat Indonesia sebagian menunjukkan sikap intoleran dan radikal yang dipengaruhi oleh gerakan Islam Transnasional. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif dan pendekatan analisis wacana. Penelitian ini berusaha mengkaji data-data dari berbagai literature yang berkaitan dengan Islam Transnasional serta infiltrasinya. Selain dari itu, penelitian ini juga mengkaji berbagai survey yang mengukur

tingkat radikalisme dan intoleransi di Indonesia. Hasil dari penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa Islam Transnasional memiliki agenda politik berupa formalisasi syariat Islam dan mendirikan khilafah Islamiyyah yang melampaui sekat-sekat bangsa serta bertentangan dengan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI). Penelitian ini merekomendasikan bahwa dalam mengkaji dan memahami Islam perlu menggunakan pendekatan kontekstual agar dapat mempertahankan nilai dan keislaman yang harmonis.

Kata Kunci: Islam Transnasional, Radikalisme, Khilafah, Formalisasi Syariat Islam

INTRODUCTION

In 2016, the Wahid Institute in collaboration with the Indonesian Survey Circle conducted a survey related to intolerant attitudes and understanding of radicalism in society.¹ The results of this survey show a significant level of intolerance and a tendency towards radicalism among Indonesian people. In a survey involving 1,520 respondents from 34 provinces, it was found that 7.7% of respondents were willing to commit radical acts if there was an opportunity, while 0.4% had done so. In addition, 2.5% of respondents stated that Pancasila is against Islam and should be replaced with Islamic sharia. In addition to this survey, Alvara Research and Mata Air Foundation also conducted research in 2017 involving various professions, including civil servants, private professionals, and workers in state-owned enterprises. The results of this research show that there is a group of people who support the idea of an Islamic state, and some even support the khilafah system.²

This phenomenon is inseparable from the influence of transnational Islam, which has a mission of purification of Islamic teachings and revivalism of the Islamic political system. Transnational Islam is not only a religious movement, but also has a political dimension that seeks to erase state boundaries and implement a global Islamic sharia-based government system. Transnational Islam was originally a religious movement that sought to carry out doctrine to Muslim communities around the world and gradually the religious movement began to develop, which initially only doctrine to the Muslim ummah then developed to intervene in local

¹ Results of the Wahid Foundation and LSI National Survey, *Potential Intolerance and Socio-Religious Radicalism among Indonesian Muslims* (2016).

² Detik News, *Alvara Survey Reveals Map of Religious Views Among Professionals*, Monday 23 October 2013, downloaded 18 December 2020

governance, even in some places aiming to create a new government system based on Islamic law.

Some examples of movements that can be categorised as Transnational Islam are the Hizbut Tahrir group, Salafi-Wahabi, Ikhwanul Muslimin and Jamaah Islamiyyah, Al-Qaeda and others. These groups have different da'wah approaches but have very strong similarities. Although the methodology and stages of da'wah are different, the strongest similarity is the goal of fighting for the formalisation of Islamic law. This article aims to examine the infiltration of transnational Islam in Indonesia, highlighting the main characteristics of this movement and its impact on social, political and religious life in Indonesia.

RESEARCH METHODS

This research belongs to the type of *library research* or library study. Namely, research that focuses on previous data, both in the form of research results, academic journals, survey reports, articles or public opinions and reports of organisations affiliated with Transnational Islam. Discourse analysis techniques will also be used to understand the pattern of infiltration and the influence of the movement on society. To research the history and development of Transnational Islam, the author not only digs up data from within the country, but tries to dig from international journals. According to Dina Sulaiman, when a researcher examines a case that occurred in the Middle East, they must pay attention to four factors involved in it. These four factors generally run intertwined with the case, namely: *triggers* (triggers), *privotal* (roots), *mobilising* (the role of leaders), and *aggravating* (factors that worsen and exacerbate the situation).³ And to know the root and then offer a solution, the author must know the factors that are intertwined in it.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

One of the interesting issues of contemporary phenomena in Indonesia since the 2000s is the emergence of the Global Islam movement or Mondial Islam, which was introduced by Hasyim Muzadi in 2007 as transnational Islam. From this term, it is implied that the scope of the Transnational Islamic movement is not only limited to national or local areas, but crosses the territorial barriers *of the nation-state*. Transnational Islam is understood as a global ideology that crosses national and state borders. It is also not only doctrinaire, but also a propaganda campaign that can influence political policy in a country. Some of the major goals of the

³ Dina Sulaiman, *Prahara Syria: Uncovering a Multi-National Conspiracy*, Pustaka Iliman, (Depok, June 2013, p. X).

transnational Islamic movement are: the formalisation of sharia in all its aspects, by making Islamic sharia the main source, uniting all Muslims in a new form of government concept by eliminating the boundaries of the state (*nation state*) which we know with the concept of *khilafah Islamiyah*, and reviving the romance of the glorious centuries of Islam.⁴

The formalisation of Sharia that leads to the establishment of the *khilafah islamiyyah* is the culmination of all transnational Islamic agendas with all their infiltration in Indonesia. Although, the methods or stages used are different. Transnational Islam initially departed from the spirit of nationalism to free Muslim countries from colonialism, such as the Muslim Brotherhood founded by Hasan Al-Banna whose initial aim was to free Egypt from western colonialism, but Al-Banna's noble goals were obscured by his successors with the aim of returning Islam as a political base (formalisation of Islamic law) by abandoning the concept of democracy and western hegemony which was considered to grip the Muslim ummah⁵. In addition to the Muslim Brotherhood, there is also Hizbut Tahrir, a group that at the beginning of its establishment aimed for the freedom of Palestine from Israeli occupation, but gradually the goal was widened with the intention of uniting Arab countries under one flag that negates national borders or *detritorialisation* in the form of *iqamah al-Khilafah al-Islamiyyah*.

Definition of Transnational Islam

If we look at its literal meaning, Islam is clearly a transnational religion. Both in terms of its theological doctrine and its legal form because the universal teachings of Islam make it timeless and cross-regional, cross-kabilah, cross-racial, cross-tribal and cross-territorial other. Therefore, Islam is a religion of mercy that is *salih}un likulli zaman wa makan*, a religion for all diverse human beings. If there are differences in the implementation or understanding of Islamic doctrines that are emphasised amid the reality of Transnational Islam, then it is a necessity. At the same time, as a historical reality that crosses time and place, Islam also simultaneously acts as a local reality and responds to any changes that occur

⁴ Zaimul Asrar, *Transnational Islam VS Moderate Islam: NU and MD's Efforts in Voicing Moderate Islam on the World Stage* (Al-Turats: Islamic Journal, volume 6, No 2, July-December 2019), pp. 117.

⁵ Aksa, *Transnational Islamic Movement: A Nomenclature, History and Influence in Indonesia* (Yupa, historical studies journal, Vol 1, No 1, January 2017), p. 3. 3.

because Islam is not only *Ilahiyah* but it is also composed of the nature of *Insaniyyah*. *Ilahiyah* in this case the religion of Islam is final, universal, eternal (*parrenial*), and knows no change (absolute) and *Insaniyyah* here demands that Islam is able to adapt to the values of locality, tradition and culture that are particular, temporary and relative. If *Ilahiyah* alone without regard to locality, tradition and culture can indeed develop as a personal religion but as a religion of collectivity will not get a place⁶. Therefore, Islam that lives in the midst of a community or locality will always be related to certain socio-historical factors. In turn, Islamic doctrines that were originally transnational, to a certain extent they will fuse contextualisation and acculturation. In this way Islam is not only a transnational religion but also a local reality.⁷

To understand the meaning of the nomenclature of transnational Islam, then we try to study it by describing it one by one. According to the Big Indonesian Dictionary (KBBI) transnational Islam comes from two words, trans which means crossing, passing, penetrating and through and national means national in nature regarding or originating from one's own nation⁸. This means that we can interpret it as a diaspora or the activity of moving people from one location to another, from one country to another. But in subsequent developments, the meaning of the term Transnational Islam began to shift to an interaction between a person or institution that crossed the boundaries of a modern national state in a patterned and structured manner and had a big agenda.

In relation to religion, in particular, the transnational *Islam movement* can be translated as a movement that has teachings or ideologies that come from one country to another. It does not come from within, but comes from outside to influence the colour of Islam that already exists in a country. This is in accordance with Peter Mandaville's explanation that the transnational Islamic movement can be interpreted as a movement that is not limited to local or national areas. Instead, its activities and organisations go far beyond the territorial barriers of the *nation-*

⁶ Kastolani and Abdullah Yusof, *The Relationship between Islam and Local Culture* (Kontemplas Journal, Vol 04 No 01, 2016) pp. 54

⁷ Azyumardi azra, "Muhammadiyah: The Challenge of Transnational Islam" in Maarif, "currents of Islamic and social thought, 100 years of Muhammadiyah: Civil Society and the challenge of Transnational Islamic movements (Yogyakarta: Maarif, Vol. 4 No. 2, 2009) pp. 14-15

⁸ Dendi Sugonp (Editor in Chief), *Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia* (Jakarta: Pusat Bahasa Departemen Pendidikan Nasional, 2008) p. 1728 and p. 1068.

state⁹. Generically, according to Masdar Hilmi, transnational Islam (*Islamic transnationalism*) can include three things; *First*, demographic movements. *Second*, transnational religious institutions. *Third*, the movement of ideas. If the first point can be interpreted with the mobility of people or groups from one place to another and from one country to another, then the second can also be interpreted with institutional devices that provide networks between several religious institutions in a number of places or countries. The third can be seen as a mode of movement or transfer of an idea or ideas from one group to another or from one country to another. This ease of movement is none other than the cause of the unstoppable wave of technology-based modernisation and globalisation¹⁰. Therefore, in the context of Indonesia, transnational Islam is a separate academic nomenclature that has a specific connotation of meaning as a style of Islam that was not born from the womb of the archipelago and did not pass through the dialectic of religious-cultural struggles, thus making itself different from other Islamic entities.

To ensure that transnational Islam is another entity or not indigenous Islam, it can be seen from the characteristics of the movement it is fighting for, such as: *First*, the formalisation or legalisation of Islamic law, the application of Islamic teachings in a *kaffah* manner and this is known as Islamic revivalism, *Second*, the concept of *al-din wa al-daulah*, the orientation not to separate religion and the state. And the *third*, making Islam as a political ideology to unite all Muslims in one flag and one command through the idea of pan-Islamism which is manifested in the form of a khilafah system¹¹. From the description above, we can conclude that the concept of Transnational Islam has a point of difference with Islam Nusantara.

The Embryo of Transnational Islam

As for the embryo or seed of the transnational Islamic movement has actually begun to emerge in Indonesia as an underground movement since the 1970s and 1980s as a result of the repression of Islamic politics during the New Order era, the transnational-based Islamic religious movement began to emerge and show its fangs after the success achieved by the Iranian population in the Iranian revolution

⁹ Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam* (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 27.

¹⁰ Masdar Hilmy, *The Roots of Islamic Transnationalism of Hisbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)*, (Islamica Journal, Vol.6, No 1, September 2011), p.1.

¹¹ Ihzan Yilmaz, *Transnational Islam*, (European Journal of Economic and Political Studies. 1, 2010)

in 1979 with the emergence of Imam Khomeini as the leader of the revolution in overthrowing the government of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, a secular government that has a US power base. Another factor was the fall of the Soeharto regime, an authoritarianism regime that fell on 21 May 1998. With the end of Soeharto's authoritarianism regime, democracy and openness were opened for every element of the nation. Political expressions and aspirations that had been restricted by Soeharto could finally be voiced and contested freely on the political stage. No doubt, if after that began to mushroom Transnational Islamic movements that make Islamic revivalism and neo-revivalism as the final line of struggle. Among them are the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) Tarbiyah movement with its PKS, and other Transnational Islamic groups.¹²

Kholid Novianto divides the transnational Islamic movement into six parts, namely; *First*, the Muslim Brotherhood centred in Egypt. *Second*, Hizbut Tahrir which had flourished in Indonesia, even though the organisation had been disbanded. *Third*, the jihadist movement that was born from the combatants of the Afghan war, this movement succeeded in creating a cross-country network of jihadist cells. *Fourth*, the salafism movement that campaigns for *neo-wahabi* understanding, this salafi movement is very strong because it gets support from Saudi Arabia. The *fifth* is the Shia group. And the *sixth* is the Jamaah Tabligh group centred in India .¹³ Apart from the various factions of the transnational Islamic movement that exist in Indonesia, here the author can categorise that the transnational Islamic movement can be grouped in the ideology of Islamic revivalism (*nahdlatul Islam*). Ideology that has the spirit to revive Islam towards its golden age (*al-ashru al-nahdhah*). This ideology is manifested in the movements of Islamic groups such as Hizbut Tahrir with its HTI, Ikhwanul Muslimin with its PKS, Salafi-Wahabi with its ideology of heresy, *takfiri* and *khurafat*. Although the movement of each of these Islamic groups is different, such as HTI which always fights for the establishment of the *khilafah ala manhaj al-nubuwwah* system, or the

¹² Ahmad Syafi'I Mufid (ed.), *Transnational Religious Development in Indonesia*, (Research and Development Centre of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Jakarta 2011), pp. 3.

¹³ Kholid Novianto, *Transnational religious movements and their traces in Indonesia* (Reform Review, Vol 1. No 01 April 2017), p. 1.

Muslim Brotherhood with its PKS which always tries to formalise Islamic law, either through academia or parliament and Salafi-Wahabi which always moves in the community, but the muara of all of them remains the same, namely Islamic neo-revivalism by making Islam its political ideology.

The Character of Transnational Islamic Movements

So far, the discussion about the Transnational Islamic movement is a movement that has a special character, so that it can be used as a characteristic in analysing it. Some characters that can be explained such as Puritanism, Radicalism, Fundamentaslime and Revivalism. Actually, these characters still have similarities with each other, but the author will try to distinguish them and why the author uses the term Transnational Islam to describe all these characters.

1. Puritanism

Regarding the meaning of the word puritan, Joel R. Brekke and Randall J. Pederson define the meaning of puritan with something negative. The word puritan according to them comes from the word *khataros* which means "puritan". Something that is intended above is intended for someone who has deviated from religion in medieval times in Europe.¹⁴ In contrast to the opinions of Jhon Coffey and Paul C.H. Lim, who are more likely to identify the meaning of puritan as a positive term. They both explain that puritanism is a reformist Protestant sect that has its own characteristics and uniqueness. This movement gained a highly respected position as a reformist church during the period of Queen Elizabeth (1558-1603 AD) which provided space for their development. These unique characters have political, ecclesiastical and religious tendencies¹⁵ According to Arrazy Hashim, the meaning of puritan in the sixteenth century was defined as a protestant reform movement and in the seventeenth century it became a political movement that fought for rights and freedoms in the face of royal tyranny. Simply put, this puritanism did not only purify the religious realm but also penetrated into the political realm. The same thing happened in the Islamic world. Accordingly, puritans are often identified with the spirit of purification, textualism or *scripturalism* and romanticism of the golden age of

¹⁴ Joel R. Brekke and Randall J. Pederson, *Preface*, from *Meet the Puritans*, p.14.

¹⁵ Jhon Coffey and Paul C.H. Lim, *The Cambridge Companion of Puritanism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.2.

early Islam. Therefore, if there is a group whose base has an agenda to purify religious teachings by returning to its main sources such as the Qur'an and al-Sunnah with a *scripturalist* reading model and still hopes for the return of the romanticism of the glory of Islam then it is included in the flow of Islamic puritanism.¹⁶

2. Fundamentalism

In addition to using the term puritanism to describe the Islamic purification movement, some observers also use the term fundamentalist with various rationalisations, such as Graham E Fuller's opinion when talking about the purification movement that occurred in Islam played by Wahabi using the term fundamentalism. In the large Indonesian dictionary, the word fundamental is an adjective that has the meaning of being basic (principal), or fundamental. The word is derived from the word 'fundament' which means the basis, principle, base and foundation¹⁷. Fundamentalism, expressed in Arabic with the word *al-ushuli* with its plural form *ushuliyyun* which means in accordance with the rules, principles and basic rules. So it can be understood that the fundamentalism movement in language studies implies that the movement is oriented *to go back to basics* and hold tightly to these teachings.

Religious fundamentalism is a religious sect that does not only exist in Islam, but in every religion, whether *samawi* or *ardhiwadhi*'. To distinguish fundamentalism from other groups, we will try to present its characteristics. *Firstly*, Scripturalism, which is a literal belief in scripture that is the word of God and has no errors. *Secondly*, *Textualism*, a character that tries to reject the use of reason in interpreting the Qur'an. *Third*, Exclusivist, anti pluralism. *Fourth*, conservative, rejecting all products of modernisation.

3. Radicalism

Radicalism linguistically starts with the spelling *radix* which means root. It means a way of thinking deeply about something down to its roots. Radicalism is an understanding that calls for change, replacement and destruction of a system of society to the roots. Radicalism wants a total change in conditions or

¹⁶ Dr Arrazy Hashim, MA, *Puritan Muslim Theology: Geneology and Salafi Teachings* (Tanggeang, Maktabah Darus Sunnah 2017) p, 24.

¹⁷ Dendi Sugono (Chief Editor), *Big Indonesian Dictionary*, (Jakarta, Balai Pustaka, 1990), p 245.

all aspects of society. Radicals think that their plan is the most ideal plan. Most scholars explain that radicalism is ideas and actions that aim to weaken and change the established political order - usually by violent means - with the old system. There is no clear equivalent of the word radicalism in Arabic, which is important because in the future the term radicalism will be used to diagnose acts of violence in the name of religion. Experts usually use the terms *ghuluw* and *thatorruf* when discussing radicalism. Sheikh Wahbah Zuhaili often does not distinguish between *ghuluw* and *thatorruf*, he defines *tathorruf* with :

كل عنف أو اعتداء أو إجرام ليس له مسوغ شرعي لأسباب سياسية أو لمحاربة نظام جائر أو لدوافع إعتقادية أو وطنية.

"Any act of violence, aggression or crime that does not have *shar'i* legitimacy due to political motives or (aims) to overthrow a system that (is) deviant or due to motives of faith or state¹⁸ "

The statement *lais}a lah}u musawwigh}un syar'iyyun* or the lack of legality of Islamic sharia is key in identifying any acts of violence in the name of religion. From the above context, it can be understood that religious radicalism is religious behaviour that wants drastic changes by taking a violent character that aims to realise its goals, namely changing certain social situations in ways that violate religious rules. The radical Islamic movement in Indonesia is not only limited to demands for the fulfilment of Islamic aspirations, such as the implementation of Islamic Sharia or the Jakarta Charter, but also broader, such as terrorist acts. The possibility of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia has two factors: internal factors and external factors. The first of the internal factors comes from Muslims themselves who have deviations that are not in accordance with religious norms. As for external factors outside Muslims, either by the authorities or western hegemony. As for the factors that are at the root of the birth of radicalism, according to Khamamizada, it has three parts, the *first* is developments at the global level where radical groups use the Middle East situation as inspiration to take up arms and acts of terror. What is happening in Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, is seen as the intervention of America

¹⁸ Wahbah al-Zuhaili, *Qa>dh}a>ya> al-Fiqh} wa> al-fikr al-Mua>'sh}i>r*, volume 1 (Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 2006), p, 398.

and its allies. The *second* factor is related to the widespread teaching of Wahabism, which incorporates conservative Arab-style Islamic culture. In relation to radicalism, Wahabi is not only a school of thought but also a mentality. Mental characteristics include being fond of making boundaries between their group and other Muslim groups, so that they easily blame and disbelieve every group that is outside their lines, even halal blood and so on. *The third* factor is poverty. Poverty, social inequality and other economic factors become one of the most important factors among other factors, because poverty makes a person dare to do anything to fulfil his needs. Profocation with the lure of wealth, position and all other pleasures make poor people ready to take up arms and even sacrifice themselves .¹⁹

4. Revivalism

The word revivalism in terms of language is derived from the word revival which means 'revival'. Meanwhile, the word revivalist means a person or group who experiences a revival from a previous static state to a dynamic and progressive one. It is also synonymous with *resurgence* or *awakening*. The word revival means to revive religious feeling, while the word *reform* is an attempt to give it a new shape. Proponents of the former are called revivalists and the latter reformists. According to Fazlur Rahman, Islamic revivalism is a movement like Wahabi, while neo revivalism is a movement like Ikhwanul Muslimin. This term is also used by Yusuf Qardhawi as *al-Sahwah al-Islamiyyah* as a substitute for the term fundamentalism which is considered less precise.

When viewed from its ideology, this revivalism movement generally fights for ideas that are believed to include (1) Islam is a state and religion (*aldin wa al-daulah*), (2) Islam is a comprehensive, totality and universal religion, (3) Returning to the true Islam, namely the Qur'an and Hadith by idealising the future of society, state and civilisation within the framework of Islamic Sharia. In understanding Islam, this revivalist movement uses a textualist or scripturalist approach. To respond to Indonesia's internal problems, revivalist

¹⁹ Khamami Zada, *Examining the roots of Radicalism in Indonesia*, (Compasiana, 22 July 2015), p. 97.

movements idealise Islam as the solution. One of the pedagogies is to seek the implementation of Islamic sharia into all aspects of life: state, politics, economy, education, culture, social, family and others .²⁰

a. Transnational islamic ideology

To make it easier for readers to understand and analyse the transnational Islamic movement , here the author divides the transnational Islamic ideology into eight points²¹ ;

1. The sovereignty of God

This understanding is the source and base of radical ideology because with this understanding of *hakimiyyah* the Khawarij group disbelieved Sayyidina Ali bin Abi Talib and other companions. This understanding favours the necessity of judging by the law of Allah²² . This understanding can be found first in the Khawarij group and now in ISIS.

2. Disbelieving the government and members of the apparatus

From this understanding of *hakimiyyah*, it eventually has implications for the disbelief of state and government officials. Because for them the only absolute is God's rule and the rest is considered thoghut. This understanding can be found in groups such as HTI.

3. The phase of Jahiliyyah

Because of the many acts of syrik or *bid'ah dhalalah* that people do, according to Transnational Islamic groups, these conditions are like the jahililiyyah period. This understanding can be seen in the puritanical ideology of Salafi Wahabi Islam.

(a) *al-wala wa al-barra*

A view that believes that people in their group are worthy of defence and justification while other groups are hated, antagonised and fought.

(b) *dar al-harb or dar al-kufr*

²⁰ Moh, Nurhakim, *Islamic Revivalism Movement and the Discourse of Sharia Implementation in Indonesia*" (Ulul Albab, Volume 12, No.1 Year 2011).

²¹ Alfanul Makki, et al, *Critique of Radical Ideology: deradicalisation of extreme religious doctrines in an effort to strengthen Islam with a national perspective*, (Kediri, Lirboyo Press, 2019), pp. 18.

²²" وَمَنْ لَمْ يَحْكَمْ بِمَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ فَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ الْكَافِرُونَ" *Whoever does not judge according to what Allah has revealed, then they are disbelievers*" QS. Al-Ma'idah, verse 44.

Believing that this country is a battlefield and kufr territory.

(c) *al jihad fi sabilillah*

This understanding emphasises jihad, warfare and the killing of people or groups considered infidels, especially state apparatus.

(d) *al-amr bi al-ma'ruf wa al-nah}i' an al-munkar*

This understanding contains the essence of da'wah which is very important, but unfortunately Transnational Islamic groups make it the basis of every violent effort to eliminate all evil.

(e) *Iqamah al-khila fah ala minhaj al-Nubuwwah*

The grand agenda of establishing *khi la fa h al-Isla miyyah* is the political and final goal of all Transnational Islamic groups' struggles. Of the many characteristics of Transnational Islam, the muzzle is only one, namely *Iqamah al-khilafah ala minh}aj al-Nubuwwah*, establishing a khilafah system that eliminates the territorial boundaries of the *nation-state*. Or at least they yearn for the formalisation of Islamic law into the private sphere. There is no doubt that all transnational Islamic sects have ideological intersections with each other because they come from the same starting line and final destination .²³

b. Transnational islamic infiltration in Indonesia

The embryo of the transnational Islamic movement in Indonesia has actually begun to develop as an underground movement since the 1970s and 1980s. Of course, this movement has not dared to appear in public because of the political repression of the New Order regime, therefore after the New Order fell, they began to dare to appear in the public domain. The groups affiliated with transnational Islamic movements in Indonesia include HTI, PKS and Salafi Wahabi. The following will review the development and initial process of the formation of PKS HTI and Salafi-Wahabi .²⁴

²³ Imdadun Rahmat, *Radical New Currents, The Transmission of Islamic Revivalism in the Middle East to Indonesia*,... h. 17.

²⁴ Syamsu Rizal, *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Network in Makassar City, South Sulawesi* in Ahmad Syafi'I Mufid, (Edt), *The Development of Transnational Religious Understanding in Indonesia* (Jakarta, Centre for Research and *Development of Religious Life*, Ministry of Religious Affairs, 2011), p. 3. 3.

1. Muslim Brotherhood / (PKS)

The development of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) as a da'wah movement is closely related to the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (DDII) and the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East. The birth of PKS began with a very busy campus da'wah movement in the 1980s. The first pioneer of this da'wah movement was Muhammad Natsir, former chairman of Masyumi and Prime Minister of Indonesia. After Masyumi was dissolved, Muhammad Natsir, who at that time served as chairman, focused his concentration on actively creating da'wah cadres by making the campus his *starting point*. After Muhammad Natsir focused his movement on da'wah regeneration on campus, DDII was created .²⁵

One of the DDII programmes that focuses on student involvement is LMD (Latihan Mujahid Dakwah). This program was Muhammad Natsir's realisation to make students the target of da'wah. In 1968, DDII arranged a regeneration programme attended by 40 student representatives from various campuses, such as ITB, Unpad, IKIP Bandung, UGM, and other state campuses, which was held at the Kwitang Hajj Dormitory, Jakarta. From the 40 student representatives, one name was born that would be the driving force for the birth of the LMD programme on various campuses throughout Indonesia. He is Imadudin Abdurrahim. Imadudin Abdurrahim was also someone who played a major role in the success of the Latihan Mujahid Dakwah (LMD) programme, which was established 6 years after the regeneration in Kwitang, in 1974 AD, centred at the Salman Mosque ITB. His experience in the late 60s as chairman of the Executive Board of the Islamic Student Da'wah Institute (PB LDMI) and secretary general of the International *Islamic Federation of Student Organization* (IIFSO) and his activity in the *World Assembly Moslem Youth* (WAMY) made him more capable in expanding DDII's da'wah network with its LMD programme.

²⁵ Dr Zuly Qoodir, *HTI and PKS Reap Criticism: The Behaviour of Indonesia's Political Islam Movement*, (Yogyakarta, Jusuf Kalla School of Government, 2013), p. 127.

After LMD cadres had spread across campus, in the 1980s the da'wah network formed a student organisation that accommodated campus da'wah activists under the name LDK (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus) and simultaneously this LDK began to grow fertile on state campuses. Finally, in 1986 all LDK representatives held a meeting at UGM Yogyakarta, which was attended by 13 campus representatives throughout Indonesia. In the following years, the number of campuses that established LDKs increased. The next meeting, in 1987, was held at UNAIR, Surabaya and it was at this meeting that the term FS-LDK or Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus was known, which later developed into KAMMI (Indonesian Muslim Student Action Unit).²⁶

KAMMI, which at the time was chaired by Fahri Hamzah, was a very vocal group against the New Order government, so when the New Order fell on 21 May 1998, KAMMI leaders considered establishing an Islamic Party under the name PK (Justice Party) which later turned into PKS (Prosperous Justice Party).²⁷ While the manhaj (method) used by PKS is the result of adoption from the Muslim Brotherhood known as the usroh system. Usroh is a Muslim Brotherhood da'wah system consisting of 5-10 people who are headed or led by a *naqib* or *murobbi*²⁸

2. Hizbut Tahrir

Hizbut Tahrir was born in Indonesia in 1982-1983 through Muhammad Musthofa and Abdurrahman Al-Baghdadi. Muhammad Musthofa was an Indonesian student who was studying in Jordan, as well as the son of Kiai Abdullah bin Nuh or famous in Bogor as Mama Nuh. Mama Nuh is a charismatic cleric with modernist views and the caretaker of Al-Ghazali Islamic Boarding School, as well as a cleric who has close ties with DDII. Abdurrahman Al-Baghdadi is a Hizbut Tahrir

²⁶ M. Imdadun Rahmat, *PKS political ideology: from campus mosque to parliament building* (Yogyakarta, LKiS Printing, Cemerlang, 2008), p. 26

²⁷ Burhanudin Muhtadi, *PKS Dilemma: Voice and Sharia*, (Jakarta, Gramedia Popular Literature, 2012), p. 43.

²⁸ M. Imdadun Rahmat, *The new currents of radical Islam: the transmission of Middle Eastern Islamic revivalism to Indonesia*, (Jakarta, Erlangga Publisher, 2005), p. 101. 101.

cadre who originated from Lebanon and then migrated to Australia before finally settling in Indonesia.

Muhammad Musthofa's introduction to Hizbut Tahrir began with his interest in the work of the founder of Hizbut Tahrir entitled *Hadharah al-Islamiyyah* which was a gift from his father, before he left for Jordan to study Islamic Education. In Jordan, Muhammad Mushtofa actually met with Hizbut Tahrir activists and got more complete books by Taqiyyudin al-Nabhani. With the introduction and access to the writings of Taqiyyudin Al-Nabhani, making Muhammad Musthofa's love for HT even greater. So that Muhammad Mushtofa made it at the same level as other Absolute Mujtahids, such as the Imams of the four Madzhab. Starting from this point, Mushtofa finally began to be involved in every da'wah activity of Hizbut Tahrir Jordan .²⁹

Abdurrahman Al-Baghdadi has been a Hizbut Tahrir cadre since he was 15 years old. He came from a family of Hizbut Tahrir activists who moved to Australia. It was in Australia that he met Abdullah bin Nuh when he visited Australia to see his son who was studying in Australia. In Australia Mama Nuh stayed at Abdurrahman Al-Baghdadi's house. It was on this occasion that Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi had an intense discussion with Abdullah bin Noah so that he was amazed at the depth of Islamic knowledge of young men who were still 25 years old. Because of his admiration, al-Baghdadi was asked to move to Indonesia so that he could help raise his al-Ghazali pesantren. In between teaching at the al-Ghazali pesantren, al-Baghdadi often visits Masjid al-Ghifari to have light discussions with students of the Bogor Agricultural University (IPB) on Islamic themes .³⁰

In 1982, Muhammad Mushtofa took a semester off to return to Indonesia and transform the Hizbut Tahrir ideology to students and santri at al-Ghazali Islamic Boarding School. As Musthofa grew closer

²⁹ M. Imdadun Rahmat, *The new currents of radical Islam: the transmission of Middle Eastern Islamic revivalism to Indonesia...*, p. 101. 101.

³⁰ Syamsu Rizal, *The Network of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia in Makassar City, South Sulawesi* in Ahmad Syafi'i Mufid, (Edt), *The Development of Transnational Religious Thought in Indonesia*, h. 9

to al-Baghdadi, his enthusiasm to spread Hizbut Tahrir's teachings grew. But after Mustofa's leave expired, he had to return to Jordan and his duties as al-Baghdadi's partner were replaced by Fathul Hidayah, Saifullah, Adian Husaini and Hasan Rifa al-Faridi .³¹

3. Salafi Wahabi.

The beginning of Salafi-Wahabi history began to enter Indonesia in the 1980s along with the opening of the Arabic Language Teaching Institute (LPBA) or known today as LIPIA (Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences). The establishment of LIPIA was the gateway to the massive influx of Salafi-Wahabi ideology and the figure who became the mediator to communicate between the Indonesian government and Saudi Arabia was Muhammad Natsir, the founder of the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (DDII). LIPIA is the third branch of Muhammad Ibn Saud University, following branches in Djibouti and Mauritania.

In addition to educational purposes, another mission of the establishment of LIPIA is to spread the Salafi-Wahabi ideology throughout the archipelago . One of the things that attracted LIPIA was the provision of full scholarships to all its students so that LIPIA succeeded in graduating thousands of alumni spread throughout Indonesia since its establishment in 1980 and from the mouths of LIPIA alumni the teachings of Salafi Wahabi spread very quickly throughout Indonesia. The teachings that are always campaigned by Salafi Wahabi are none other than puritanisation of Islam, takfirism, the concept of thoghut, bid'ah and others related to Aqidah .³²

CONCLUSIONS

Transnational Islam is a cross-border and cross-country movement that aims to influence the ideology of its followers or even change the governance of society and its government. The results of a survey conducted by the Wahid Institute in collaboration with the Indonesian Survey Circle and Alvara Research are an

³¹ Dr Zuly Qoodir, *HTI and PKS Reap Criticism: The Behaviour of Indonesia's Political Islam Movement*,... p. 51.

³² Nur Khalik Ridwan, *The Complete History of Wahabi: A Long Journey of History, Doctrine, Practice and struggle*, (Yogyakarta, IRCiSoD, 2020).

illustration of the people who have been influenced by his studies and preaching activities. The characteristics of the Transnational Islamic Movement are that it carries puritanism, fundamentalism, radicalism and revivalism. As for the ideology that he usually fights for, one of which is, God's Sovereignty (*al-Hakimiyyah*), Calumniating the Government and Members of the Apparatus (*Takfir al-Hukkam wa al-ajhizah al-daulah*), Jahiliyyah Phase (*Jahiliyyah al-alam*), *Al-Wala wa al-Barra*, *Al-Jihad fi Sabilillah*, *Al-amr bi al-ma'ruf wa al-nahi' an al-munkar* and *Iqamah al-khilafah ala minhaj al-Nubuwwah*.

The form of Transnational Islamic Infiltration in Indonesia can be seen from the linkage of ideology and movement, such as between the Muslim Brotherhood and PKS, Salafi Wahabi with Wahabi groups, Hizbut Tahrir with HTI. Although the methodology of preaching of Transnational Islamic groups is different, such as PKS which directs its focus more on controlling parliament and penetrating educational institutions, Salafi-Wahabi which focuses more on strengthening the ideology of Salafi Wahabi through majlis ta'lim and HTI which focuses more on the formation of an institution or state that is able to accommodate all Muslims, but the muzzle remains the same, namely the formalisation of Islamic law which leads to the establishment of the Islamic caliphate.

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